Fox v. Dish Network: Sony BetaMax and the Ninth Circuit\u27s Failure to Ad-Skip to the Future by Porter, Alexander E.
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Intellectual Property Journal Akron Law Journals
April 2016
Fox v. Dish Network: Sony BetaMax and the Ninth
Circuit's Failure to Ad-Skip to the Future
Alexander E. Porter
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Intellectual Property Journal by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more
information, please contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Porter, Alexander E. (2015) "Fox v. Dish Network: Sony BetaMax and the Ninth Circuit's Failure to Ad-Skip to the
Future," Akron Intellectual Property Journal: Vol. 8 : Iss. 1 , Article 5.
Available at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol8/iss1/5
 173 
Fox v. Dish Network: 
Sony BetaMax And The Ninth Circuit’s 
Failure To Ad-Skip To The Future 
Alexander E. Porter* 
I.  Introduction ....................................................................... 173 
II.  Background ........................................................................ 177 
A. Fair Use ....................................................................... 178 
B. Time-shifting, Ad-skipping, and Library-building ..... 182 
III.  Statement of the Case ........................................................ 187 
A. Facts of the Case ......................................................... 187 
B. Procedural History ...................................................... 189 
C. Decision ...................................................................... 190 
IV.  Analysis ............................................................................. 190 
A. Exclusion of AutoHop ................................................ 191 
B. First Fair Use Factor ................................................... 193 
1. The PTAT Copies are Not Transformative ........... 193 
2. PTAT is Not Used for Time-shifting ..................... 194 
3. PTAT Copies are More Commercial than Time-
shifting in Sony ...................................................... 198 
C. Second and Third Fair Use Factor .............................. 200 
1. Second Fair Use Factor.......................................... 200 
2. Third Fair Use Factor ............................................ 201 
D. Fourth Fair Use Factor ................................................ 203 
V.  Conclusion ......................................................................... 205 
Introduction 
Do you still use Sony’s Betamax Video Tape Recorder (VTR) to 
record television programming? Or do you prefer to use something more 
modern, such as a digital video recorder (DVR)? Apparently the Ninth 
1
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Circuit prefers to stick with Sony’s VTR for its legal analysis.1 In Fox 
Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C.2 the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the lower court’s denial of a preliminary injunction, reasoning 
that it is fair use for Dish subscribers to amass libraries of primetime 
programming from Fox, ABC, NBC, and CBS (Major Networks) with 
Dish Network’s Primetime Anytime service.3 The court’s decision 
rested on its strict adherence to a U.S. Supreme Court decision from 
1984 that held recording television programming on Sony’s Betamax 
VTR is fair use.4 If the Ninth Circuit’s decision is indicative of anything, 
the entire business model of the broadcasting industry may be in 
jeopardy. 
The broadcasting industry is at war. The Major Networks are 
battling to maintain a stable source of income, whether through 
retransmission fees or advertising revenue. For instance, Time Warner 
Cable (Time Warner) and CBS recently ended a month-long dispute 
over a new retransmission consent agreement that would permit Time 
Warner to retransmit CBS’s television programming to Time Warner’s 
customers.5 At the center of the dispute was what the industry is paying 
for retransmission rights.6 Although CBS was asking for a 600% 
increase in retransmission fees, its demands were in sync with the rest of 
the industry.7 The stalemate produced a “black-out” after Time Warner 
elected to stop providing the CBS-owned Showtime, TMC, Flix, and 
Smithsonian networks to their three million subscribers in major 
metropolitan areas across the nation.8 Time Warner and CBS 
compromised in early September 2013, but such disputes are 
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 1.  See infra Part III. 
 2.  Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 723 F.3d 1067, 1067 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 3.  See infra Part III. 
 4.  See infra Part II.C. 
 5.  Jon Lafayette, Time Warner Drops CBS Stations, BROADCASTING & CABLE (Aug. 2, 
2013, 5:12 PM), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/news-articles/time-warner-drops-cbs-
stations/114693; see also Victoria Slind-Flor, CBS, Google, Nestle, Umami, HTC: Intellectual 
Property (1), BLOOMBERG WIRE (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-04/cbs-
google-nestle-umami-htc-intellectual-property.html. 
 6.  Lafayette, supra note 5. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
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commonplace in the industry.9 In fact, Fox and Dish Network had a 
similar dispute in 2010 before finally renegotiating the retransmission 
consent agreement that is at issue in the current proceedings.10 This 
tension in the industry also grabbed Congressional attention.11 To top it 
off, the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to settle an ongoing 
dispute between the Major Networks and Aereo, a company that uses 
mini-antennas to capture broadcast television and then record it on 
cloud-based digital video recorders for its users.12 
It is no coincidence that as the Major Networks struggle to charge a 
premium for retransmission rights, they are also battling Dish Network 
in “the biggest copyright case since Napster.”13 The litigation is over 
Dish’s “Hopper” HD DVR system and Primetime Anytime (PTAT) 
service.14 PTAT includes “AutoHop,” an ad-skipping service that 
eliminates all commercials from primetime programming.15 By skipping 
over the commercials in the Major Networks’ programming, Dish’s 
AutoHop undercuts the value of those commercials to advertisers.16 
Since advertising revenues generate 90% of funding for the television 
programming provided by the Major Networks, Dish Network’s new 
services jeopardize the financial stability of the entire broadcasting 
industry.17 
Evidently, the issues presented in Fox v. Dish Network affect an 
entire industry rather than the two named parties. Higher retransmission 
 
 9.  Id. For instance, Time Warner has taken down nearly 50 other channels in the past 5 
years for similar disputes. Id. 
 10.  See Meg James, Fox, Dish Network Resolve Dispute, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2010), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/30/business/fi-ct-dish-20101030. Interestingly enough, the 2010 
agreement is also at issue in Fox v. Dish Network. See Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 
723 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 11.  In May 2013, Arizona Senator John McCain introduced a bill that would drive down 
costs for consumers by requiring cable providers to offer programming on an “a la carte” basis 
instead of through bundles. See Television Consumer Freedom Act of 2013, S. 912, 113th Cong. 
(2013). 
 12.  See Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 896 (2014). The Aereo litigation is 
only one facet of the broadcasting industry’s ongoing struggle to maintain control over how its 
programming is viewed. See Sarah Weber, The Supreme Court Could Decide How You Watch TV, 
BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 11, 2014, 3:36 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-supreme-court-could-
decide-how-you-watch-tv-2014-1. 
 13.  Meg James & Dawn C. Chmielewski, Networks’ Fight with Dish over Ad-skipping has 
Huge Implications, L.A. TIMES (May 25, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/
2012/may/25/entertainment/la-et-ct-broadcast-networks-fight-with-dish-over-adskipping-has-
enormous-implications-20120525 (quoting Attorney Bonnie Eskenazi). 
 14.  See Complaint at 2, Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (C.D. 
Cal. 2012) (No. CV12-04529GHK(SHx)). 
 15.  Id. at 35. 
 16.  Id. at 22. 
 17.  Id. at 21-23. 
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fees for cable providers may be in the near future if advertisers lose their 
incentive to pay for commercial spots on the Major Networks. If cable 
and satellite television providers such as Time Warner pay higher 
retransmission fees, those increases will ultimately be passed to the 
consumers.18 Indeed, the three million “black-out” victims may have 
only received a taste of what is to come. The various amicus briefs of the 
current proceedings also reflect the multiple interests at stake and the 
implications the Fox v. Dish Network litigation may have.19 
Furthermore, the Fox v. Dish Network litigation afforded the Ninth 
Circuit the opportunity to address the legality of two practices that have 
yet to be adequately addressed: library-building and ad-skipping.20 The 
Ninth Circuit’s decision avoided these issues by applying the fair use 
doctrine incorrectly.21 Although fair use is a fact-specific doctrine, the 
court equated the facts of Fox v. Dish Network to Sony Corp. of America 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc.22 in order to avoid addressing both issues. 
This Note argues that if the Ninth Circuit had conducted a more in-depth 
fair use analysis, it would have found that Sony was less controlling than 
the court purported it to be, and that the use of Dish’s PTAT does not 
constitute fair use. 
Part II of this Note discusses the doctrine of fair use, its application 
in Sony, and how the ruling of Sony has been relatively unchallenged 
since 1984.23 The discussion portrays the significance of the Fox v. Dish 
Network litigation and also helps the reader recognize the inadequate fair 
use analysis of the Ninth Circuit. Part III discusses the facts of the Fox v. 
Dish Network litigation. Part IV addresses the Ninth Circuit’s erroneous 
decision to exclude Dish’s AutoHop service from its analysis and 
subsequently analyzes each fair use factor individually.24 This part also 
shows how the court ignored critical factual differences between Dish’s 
PTAT service and Sony’s VTR and how the court consequently erred in 
using Sony’s fair use analysis as a crutch in its analysis. Finally, Part IV 
offers concluding remarks about the Fox v. Dish Network litigation. 
 
 18.  See James & Chmielewski, supra note 13. 
 19.  Brief for Cablevision Systems Corp. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants; 
Brieffor ABC Television Affiliates et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants; Brief for Nat’l 
Assoc. of Broadcasters Supporting Appellants; Brief for Paramount Pictures Corp. et al. as Amici 
Curiae Urging Reversal; Brief for Advertising Council, Inc., as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-
Appellants, Dish, 905 F. Supp. 2d 1088. 
 20.  Fair use is an affirmative defense to copyright infringement. See Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985) (noting that the drafters structured § 
107 as an affirmative defense). 
 21.  See infra Part IV. 
 22.  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 23.  See infra Part II. 
 24.  See infra Part III. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
It is necessary to discuss some preliminary information to fully 
appreciate the significance of the Fox v. Dish Network litigation. Fox is 
seeking to hold Dish liable for direct and contributory copyright 
infringement.25 Contributory copyright infringement is a form of liability 
imposed to hold one liable for the infringing conduct of another when 
the circumstances warrant it.26 Dish asserted that the use of PTAT by its 
users is fair use, which is an affirmative defense to a copyright 
infringement claim.27 Because the Ninth Circuit agreed with Dish, Fox 
failed on its contributory copyright infringement claim; therefore, no 
infringement liability remained.28 Thus, it is necessary to discuss the 
legal underpinnings of fair use because it determines whether Dish can 
be held liable for contributory copyright infringement. 
The Ninth Circuit’s fair use analysis hinged on the Supreme Court’s 
 
 25.  Complaint, supra note 14, at 51-76. 
 26.  See Sony, 464 U.S. at 435. There are generally two types of contributory infringers: 
providers of a service or distributors of a product. See 4 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
12.04 [A][3] (2009); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2003); Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 942 (2005). Traditionally, courts held 
individuals liable “who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially 
contributes to the infringing conduct of another.” See Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists 
Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). The Supreme Court added the second category for 
distributors of products in Sony, where it adopted patent law’s substantial non-infringing uses 
standard, which immunizes the distributor of a product if it is capable of substantial non-infringing 
uses. Sony, 464 U.S. at 441-42. Since Sony, courts have struggled with the doctrine of contributory 
infringement and often reach contradicting results. See Brandon Michael Francavillo, Comment, 
Pretzel Logic: The Ninth Circuit’s Approach to Contributory Copyright Infringement Mandates 
That the Supreme Court Revisit Sony, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 855, 872 (2004) (discussing the different 
results reached by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits in contributory copyright infringement cases 
involving peer-to-peer technology); Jesse M. Feder, Is Betamax Obsolete?: Sony Corp. of America 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc. in the Age of Napster, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 859, 861 (2004) 
(arguing that the different results reached in peer-to-peer cases show the need to reflect on the 
viability of Sony). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Grokster in 2005, and many hoped 
the decision would clarify the contributory infringement doctrine. However, the Court only briefly 
discussed Sony and adopted patent law’s inducement doctrine instead. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 913. As 
a result, the contributory infringement doctrine still remains unclear and inconsistent. See generally 
Mark Bartholomew & Patrick F. McArdle, Causing Infringement, 64  VAND. L. REV. 675 (2011) 
(arguing that the courts should adopt principles from epidemiology to create a more certain 
contributory infringement doctrine); Alfred C. Yen, Sony, Tort Doctrines, and the Puzzle of Peer-to-
Peer, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 815 (2005); Rebecca Giblin, A Bit Liable? A Guide to Navigating 
the U.S. Secondary Liability Patchwork, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 7 (2009); 
David L. Wardle, Broken Record: Revisiting the Flaws in Sony’s Fair Use Analysis in Light of the 
Grokster Decision, 26 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1 (2005). Therefore, Fox v. Dish Network offers an 
opportunity to clarify the obscure contributory infringement doctrine. 
 27.  See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985) (noting 
that the drafters structured § 107 as an affirmative defense). 
 28.  See Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 723 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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landmark Sony decision from 1984.29 It is therefore imperative that 
Sony’s fair use analysis is dissected to understand how it compares to the 
Fox v. Dish Network litigation. Moreover, consumers used Sony’s 
Betamax VTR for time-shifting, ad-skipping, and library-building, but 
the Supreme Court only addressed the legality of time-shifting.30 A brief 
survey of various changes since 1984 demonstrates that despite the 
proliferation of more advanced time-shifting devices, the legality of 
time-shifting, library-building, and ad-skipping has not been challenged 
since 1984.31 
A. Fair Use 
The fundamental policy of copyright law is to promote “the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts.”32 To further this policy, the 
Copyright Act of 1976 (the Act) granted exclusive rights to authors, 
subject to certain limitations.33 One such limitation is the fair use 
doctrine.34 Fair use is an affirmative defense that enables the 
unauthorized use of copyrighted work without liability for 
infringement.35 This fulfills the policy of copyright law by allowing 
people to build upon the works of others without legal repercussions.36 
Before the Act, courts applied fair use as an equitable rule of reason 
tailored to the particular facts of each case.37 When Congress passed the 
Act, it expressly stated that it only intended to give statutory recognition 
to the doctrine and that § 107 should not be construed to alter it in any 
manner.38 Except for a minor change in 1992, Congress continues to 
have little involvement in the application of the fair use doctrine.39 
 
 29.  See infra Part IV. 
 30.  See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442-56. 
 31.  See infra Part II.B. 
 32.  See U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 8; see also Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 884 (2012); 
Sony, 464 U.S. at 477 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 33.  The preamble of § 106 grants exclusive rights “subject to sections 107 through 122.” 17 
U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
 34.  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 35.  See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985) (noting 
that the drafters structured § 107 as an affirmative defense). 
 36.  See Sony, 464 U.S. 417, 477; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 
(1994). Fair use also functions as a safeguard to freedom of expression. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 
891. 
 37.  See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl.1973), aff’d, 
420 U.S. 376 (1975); Benny v. Loew’s, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956). 
 38.  See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976); S. Rep. No. 94-473 (1975). 
 39.  After Harper & Row, courts began to give too much weigh to the unpublished nature of a 
copyrighted work. See NIMMER, supra note 26, § 13.05 [A][2]. In response, Congress amended § 
107 to state that “the fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use.” See 
Fair Use of Unpublished Works, Pub. L. No. 102-492, 106 Stat. 3145 (1992). 
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The Supreme Court has only decided three fair use cases since 
1976, and while the decisions provide assistance to lower courts, they 
are not bright line rules.40 Because fair use depends on the facts of each 
case, no clear definition has ever emerged.41 Aware of this, Congress 
provided a list of non-exclusive factors to be considered in § 107 while 
emphasizing that each decision should be tailored to the particular facts 
of the case.42 
The first factor under § 107 directs the court to consider the purpose 
and character of the use in question, which includes considering whether 
such use is for commercial or nonprofit purposes.43 However, the 
profit/nonprofit distinction has minimal utility.44 The Supreme Court’s 
original position was that every commercial use is presumptively 
unfair.45 This is problematic because nearly every use, including the 
examples in § 107’s preamble, is for profit.46 Thus, the Court’s more 
recent decision refuted this presumption and clarified that a profit-driven 
purpose is only one of many factors to be considered.47 Given the 
problems with the profit/nonprofit distinction, courts are more inclined 
to focus on the use instead of the user, and view the commercial nature 
as a matter of degree rather than an absolute.48 
The overarching purpose of the first factor analysis is to determine 
whether the use in question is “transformative.”49 A work is 
transformative if it adds new expression, meaning, or something of a 
different character.50 Courts favor a transformative use because it is 
consistent with the legislative intent behind § 107 and the overall policy 
of copyright law.51 While it is not required that a new work be 
“transformative,” it is the dominant judicial test.52 The majority of 
 
 40.  See Sony, 464 U.S. 417; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 588. 
The Supreme Court also addressed fair use in Stewart v. Abend. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 
(1990). However, this decision is often not included in the Supreme Court’s fair use decisions 
because of its short analysis. See Stephen McJohn, The Case of the Missing Case: Stewart v. Abend 
and Fair Use, 53 IDEA 323 (2013). 
 41.  See Sony, 464 U.S. at 475-76 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 42.  See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976); S. Rep. No. 94-473 (1975). 
 43.  17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012). 
 44.  See Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 1998) (observing that 
“commerciality has only limited usefulness to a fair use inquiry). 
 45.  Sony, 464 U.S. at 449. 
 46.  Kirkwood, 150 F.3d at 109; Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
539, 592 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 47.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994). 
 48.  See WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON FAIR USE § 3:4 (2014 ed.). 
 49.  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  In Campbell, the court noted that while a transformative use is not necessary, it furthers 
7
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transformative uses are also held to be fair use.53 The Court adopted this 
view in its most recent fair use decision, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, when 
it found that the rap group 2 Live Crew’s rendition of “Oh, Pretty 
Woman” was transformative due to its parodic nature.54 Also, the more 
transformative a use is, the less significant other factors are, such as its 
commercial nature.55 
The second fair use factor directs the court to consider “the nature 
of the copyrighted work.”56 This factor recognizes that some works are 
more deserving of copyright protection than others.57 A common 
approach is to differentiate between factual and entertainment works.58 
The scope of fair use is greater for factual or informative works because 
they “lend themselves to productive uses by others.”59 The subsequent 
use of informative works also furthers the policy of copyright law by 
disseminating information to the public.60 Therefore, the fair use defense 
is narrower for creative or entertainment works because it does not 
further the policy of copyright law as much as informative works.61 
However, the distinction between informative and entertainment works 
is not dispositive, and it should not be given much weight.62 In Harper 
 
the goal of copyright law. Id. Since Campbell’s adoption of the transformative test, it has become 
the dominant fair use test. See Michael D. Murray, What Is Transformative? An Explanatory 
Synthesis of the Convergence of Transformation and Predominant Purpose in Copyright Fair Use 
Law, 11 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 260 (2012). 
 53.  Various empirical studies from 2008 to 2011 indicate that a transformative use almost 
always guarantees a finding of fair use. See Murray, supra note 52, at 262. 
 54.  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79. 
 55.  Id. at 584. This observation that the commercial nature is only one factor to be considered 
in the first factor analysis is a retreat from Sony where the Court stated that every commercial use is 
presumptively unfair. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984). 
Cases before Sony never recited such a presumption, and Justice Marshall’s papers indicate that the 
presumption appeared somewhat spontaneously because it was not included in previous drafts nor 
discussed by the justices. See Jonathan Band & Andrew J. McLaughlin, The Marshall Papers: A 
Peek Behind the Scenes at the Making of Sony v. Universal, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 427, 427 
(1993). 
 56.  17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2012). 
 57.  See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
 58.  PATRY, supra note 48, § 4:1. 
 59.  Sony, 464 U.S. at 496-97 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 60.  Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 595 (1985) (stating that 
the law recognizes a greater need for public dissemination of factual works). 
 61.  See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (discussing various decisions distinguishing 
between creative and factual, or informative, works). 
 62.  While some works may be factual in nature, they can still have more creative expression 
than other works classified as fictional works. See PATRY, supra note 48, § 4.1; NIMMER, supra note 
26, § 13.05[A][2][a]. Thus, courts tend to avoid a bright line rule and recognize that the amount of 
creativity varies by individual works and not categories. See Robert A. Gorman, Fact or Fancy? 
The Implications for Copyright, 29 J. COPYRIGHT SOC. 560, 563 (1982) (noting how there are 
gradations among factual works between the amount of “fact or fancy”). As a result, most courts are 
reluctant to adopt a categorical approach. See Wade Williams Distribution, Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., 
8
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& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, the Supreme Court also 
recognized that whether a work is published or unpublished is a critical 
element of its nature.63 But the unpublished nature of a work is only one 
factor to consider, and it should not preclude a finding of fair use.64 
Third, the court must consider “the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”65 This 
factor has both a quantitative and qualitative component.66 The copying 
of an entire program militates against a finding of fair use.67 At the same 
time, an insubstantial amount of copying may also weigh against a 
finding of fair use if it is the “heart” of the work.68 For instance, in 
Harper & Row, the defendant copied and published a portion of 
President Ford’s unpublished manuscript.69 Although the publisher only 
used approximately 13% of the work, the portion taken was “the most 
interesting and moving part of the entire manuscript.”70 The Supreme 
Court held that this factor did not favor a finding of fair use.71 
Finally, and perhaps the most critical, is the “effect of the use upon 
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”72 Market 
harm is most evident when the defendant duplicates the plaintiff’s work 
because the copy acts as a market substitute for the plaintiff’s work.73 
But this analysis also includes consideration of the potential markets that 
a copyright holder would generally develop.74 For instance, in Campbell 
vs. Acuff-Rose, the Supreme Court declined to find market harm for 2 
Live Crew’s parody because a copyright holder has no protectable 
derivative market for criticism.75 However, 2 Live Crew’s parody was a 
 
Inc., No. 00 Civ. 5002 (LMM), 2005 WL 774275 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2005) (declining to adopt a rule 
that precludes a fair use defense when the works are for entertainment purposes); Hofheinz v. 
Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., No. 00 CIV. 3802 (HB), 2001 WL 1111970, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 
2001) (refusing to engage in “subjective line-drawing” over what constitutes commentary and 
entertainment); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563 (recognizing that the amount of expression varies 
by works). 
 63.  Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564. 
 64.  After Harper & Row, courts began giving too much weight to the unpublished nature of 
works, which induced Congress to amend § 107. See supra note 39. 
 65.  17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2012). 
 66.  See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564-66; PATRY, supra note 48, § 5:1. 
 67.  PATRY, supra note 48, § 5:3. 
 68.  Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012). 
 73.  Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 588. 
 74.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994). 
 75.  Id. at 592-94. 
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rap version of the original work.76 If the plaintiffs intended on making a 
rap version of “Oh, Pretty Woman,” then they could have introduced 
evidence to show the market harm to this derivative market.77 Overall, 
the fourth factor is concerned with whether the defendant’s unrestricted 
conduct would have an adverse impact on the demand for the plaintiff’s 
work.78 
B. Time-shifting, Ad-skipping, and Library-building 
In addition to altering the landscape of secondary liability for 
copyright infringement, Sony also held that it is fair use for a Betamax 
VTR user to record television programming within their home for later 
viewing, a practice known as time-shifting.79 Sony’s VTRs consisted of 
three components: a tuner, a recorder, and an adapter.80 VTR users could 
use the tuner to tune into a particular channel or station, and then the 
recording component would make copies of the signals onto a Betamax 
tape.81 The adapter converted the signals from the Betamax tape to the 
television so a user could watch the recordings.82 VTRs also had pause 
and fast forward functions.83 While recording, a user could press and 
hold the pause button to omit that portion of programming from the 
recording.84 Thus, a user could omit commercials in the recording, 
“provided, of course, that the viewer is present when the program is 
recorded.”85 The Court did not rule on the legality of ad-skipping, 
though, because it was far too tedious of a practice at the time to make it 
a significant threat to the plaintiffs.86 Additionally, users could use the 
fast forward button to rapidly skip advertisements or segments of the 
recorded programs.87 The surveys presented at trial also showed that a 
vast number of users had accumulated libraries of recordings, but this 
practice did not prove to be too detrimental because of the transaction 
costs for the consumer.88 
 
 76.  Id. at 572-74. 
 77.  Id. at 593-94. 
 78.  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984); see also 
NIMMER, supra note 26, § 13.05 [A][4]. 
 79.  Sony, 464 U.S. at 417. 
 80.  Id. at 422. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. at 423. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. at 452 n. 36. 
 87.  Id. at 423. 
 88.  One witness initially set out to build a library of tapes but the costs of purchasing 
cassettes proved too expensive. Id. at 423 n. 3. 
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Universal argued that Sony provided the “means” for infringement 
and that precedent held it should be liable for contributory 
infringement.89 Justice Stevens disagreed and borrowed patent law’s 
staple article of commerce doctrine, which immunizes a defendant if his 
or her component or object is capable of substantial noninfringing 
uses.90 The Court thus faced the ultimate question: was the VTR capable 
of substantial non-infringing uses?91 
The Court found that private, non-commercial time-shifting 
satisfied its new standard for two reasons.92 First, some copyright 
holders did not object to users making copies of their programs.93 The 
district court heard testimony from various commissioners of 
professional sports leagues, educational communications agencies, and 
people such as Fred Rogers from Mister Rogers Neighborhood, who 
voiced no objections to private copying of their copyrighted programs.94 
In addition to the authorized copying, the district court also found that 
use of the VTR could enlarge the total viewing audience.95 
Second, the Court found that unauthorized time-shifting constituted 
fair use, thereby making it a non-infringing use.96 Applying the first fair 
use factor, the Court adopted the district court’s finding that time-
shifting for private purposes at one’s home was non-commercial in 
nature.97 For the second and third fair use factors, the Court simply 
stated that “when one considers the nature of a televised . . . work . . . 
and that time-shifting merely enables a viewer to see such a work which 
he had been invited to witness in its entirety free of charge, the fact that 
the entire work is reproduced . . . does not have its ordinary effect of 
militating against a finding of fair use.”98 On the final inquiry, the 
potential market effect, the Court stated that for Universal to carry its 
burden, it had to prove either that time-shifting itself is harmful or, if it 
became widespread, that it would adversely affect the potential market 
for Universal’s copyrighted programming.99 To show this, Universal did 
not need to show actual harm; it merely needed to show “some 
 
 89.  Id. at 435. 
 90.  Id. at 441-42. 
 91.  Id. at 442. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. at 443-47. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. at 443. 
 96.  Id. at 454. 
 97.  Id. at 449. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 451. 
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meaningful likelihood of future harm exists.”100 With this clarification, 
the Court reasoned that Universal failed to carry its burden because its 
predictions of market harm hinged on speculation, and it presented no 
evidence that it had incurred any actual harm.101 
Justice Blackmun dissented, claiming that the Court’s opinion 
severely altered and ignored the doctrines of fair use and contributory 
infringement.102 The fair use doctrine exists to protect productive works 
that further the policy of copyright law, and time-shifting did not do 
that.103 According to him, the Court misapplied two of the fair use 
factors while completely ignoring the other two.104 Specifically, it failed 
to properly consider the potential market for the copyrighted works by 
focusing only on the fact that there has been no harm to the copyright 
holder.105 Instead, the Court should have focused on the impairment of 
Universal’s ability to demand compensation for the use of their 
copyrighted works.106 The fact that the Betamax VTR created a potential 
market of “time-shifters” in which the copyright holder had not entered 
before does not mean Sony can exploit it without compensating the 
copyright holders.107 
Much has changed since 1984. Sony’s Betamax VTR is a device of 
the past, and the modern time-shifting device is the DVR.108 A 
traditional DVR is comparable to a VTR because it simply records 
television programming on a hard drive rather than a cassette.109 But 
even traditional DVRs are far more than just modern VTRs because the 
features are augmented, they can split the advertising and content, record 
a tremendous amount more than a VTR, and various other reasons.110 A 
primary reason for the enhanced features of the DVR is the switch from 
analog to digital transmission.111 The switch to digital television 
 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 451-55. 
 102.  Id. at 457 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 103.  Id. at 485. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. at 484-85. 
 107.  Id. at 485 (citing Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57 
(2d Cir. 1980)). 
 108.  Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 109.  Daniel E. Abrams, Comment, Personal Video Recorders, Emerging Technology and the 
Threat to Antiquate the Fair Use Doctrine, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 127, 134 (2004). 
 110.  See generally Randal C. Picker, The Digital Video Recorder: Unbundling Advertising 
and Content, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 205, 206 (2004); Abrams, supra note 109, at 134-35; Ned Snow, 
The TiVo Question: Does Skipping Commercials Violate Copyright Law?, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
27, 35 (2005). 
 111.  The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) began a mandatory transition from 
analog to digital transmission in 2006 and completed it in 2012. See Thomas S. Fletcher, Note, 
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proliferated the availability and use of DVRs. Specifically, between the 
2007-2008 and 2010-2011television seasons, the use of DVRs doubled 
from 19% to 38%.112 
Although digital television (DTV) offers more features for 
consumers, it also poses a significant risk of piracy for content 
owners.113 Addressing this problem, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) passed a form of Digital Rights Management called 
the Broadcast Flag.114 Content providers would be given the ability to 
“flag” the content they provided, and hardware manufacturers of DTV-
related devices were required to include a chip that could detect the 
flagged content.115 The Broadcast Flag limited what consumers could 
record with their DTV device.116 Not surprisingly, the Broadcast Flag 
encountered much controversy.117 The American Library Association 
filed suit against the FCC, and the court held that the FCC overstepped 
its authority.118 In response, several representatives introduced the 
Digital Transition Content Security Act of 2005 to give the FCC the 
appropriate authority, but the bill died after its introduction into the 
House.119 The FCC litigation never addressed whether time-shifting of 
DTV constituted fair use.120 
Only two other cases have surfaced since Sony, and they did not 
disturb its fair use holding.121 In Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, a 
cable service provider released a remote storage digital video recorder 
(RS-DVR), which differed from a traditional DVR because it stored 
recorded copies on Cablevision’s remote server instead of a hard drive in 
 
American Library Ass’n v. FCC: Charting the Future of Content Protection for Digital Television, 
21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 613, 615 (2006); In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in 
the Mkt. for the Delivery of Video Programming, 27 F.C.C. RCD. 8610, 8612 (2012) [hereinafter 
Annual Assessment]. For the benefits of digital transmission, see Andrew W. Bagley & Justin S. 
Brown, The Broadcast Flag: Compatible with Copyright Law & Incompatible with Digital Media 
Consumers, 47 IDEA 607, 608 (2007). 
 112.  Annual Assessment, supra note 111, at 8613. 
 113.  Bagley & Brown, supra note 111, at 608; see also In Re Digital Broad. Content Prot., 18 
F.C.C. RCD. 23550, 23552 (2003). 
 114.  Bagley & Brown, supra note 111, at 608. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Fletcher, supra note 111, at 621-27. 
 118.  Am. Library Ass’n v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 406 F.3d 689, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 119.  Digital Transition Content Security Act of 2005, H.R. 4569, 109th Cong. (2005). See 
generally Jessica L. Talar, Comment, My Place or Yours: Copyright, Place-Shifting, & the 
Slingbox: A Legislative Proposal, 17 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 25, 44-46 (2007). 
 120.  Bagley & Brown, supra note 111, at 609. 
 121.  See Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 
2008); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. RePlay TV, 298 F. Supp. 2d 921, 923 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 
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the user’s set-top box.122 The plaintiffs only alleged direct infringement 
against Cablevision, not contributory infringement.123 Consequently, the 
case turned on who made the copies: the user or Cablevision.124 The 
Second Circuit held that Cablevision did not meet the volitional conduct 
threshold to impose direct liability.125 The decision did not address 
whether time-shifting with the RS-DVR constituted fair use.126 
The second case arose in 2004 when Paramount Pictures sued 
RePlay TV for offering a DVR with a function that enabled its users to 
skip commercials.127 Users could also send their recordings to other 
RePlay TV subscribers via high-speed internet connections.128 The 
litigation drained the defendant’s bank accounts, causing it to file for 
bankruptcy.129 A third party then purchased the defendant’s company 
and chose not to include the two features at issue in the litigation.130 As a 
result, the court dismissed the case.131 Around the same time, Congress 
passed the Family Home Movie Act, which created a copyright 
infringement exemption for makers of devices that skip obscene or 
offensive content in motion pictures.132 The original version of the 
statute excluded ad-skipping technologies from the exception.133 
However, the Senate opposed this provision and feared that it would 
create inferences regarding the pending ad-skipping litigation.134 Thus, 
neither the legislature nor the judiciary ever addressed the issue. 
In sum, Sony held that time-shifting with a VTR is fair use.135 
Despite technological changes, the legality of time-shifting remains 
unchallenged because it is assumed Sony controls.136 By only addressing 
time-shifting, Sony did not expressly decide whether library-building or 
ad-skipping is considered fair use.137 The plaintiffs in RePlayTV relied 
 
 122.  Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 124. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. at 126. 
 125.  Id. at 133. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Complaint at 48, Paramount Pictures Corp. v. RePlay TV, 298 F. Supp. 2d 921 (C.D. Cal. 
2004) (Civ. No. 01-09358 CAS (Ex)). 
 128.  RePlay TV, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 923. 
 129.  Ethan O. Notkin, Note, Television Remixed: The Controversy over Commercial-Skipping, 
16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 899, 917 (2006). 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  RePlay TV, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 923. 
 132.  Id. at 917. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. at 918. 
 135.  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 457 (1984). 
 136.  See Bradley Hamburger, Digital Video Recorders, Advertisement Avoidance, and Fair 
Use, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 567, 576 (2010). 
 137.  See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003) (observing that 
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on this when it brought claims against RePlayTV, but the action did not 
provide answers.138 The legislature had the opportunity to address the 
issue, but chose to leave it to the courts.139 Therefore, the legality of ad-
skipping, library-building, and modern time-shifting has yet to be 
adequately addressed by the judiciary or legislature. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Facts of the Case 
Fox is one of the four major broadcasting networks in the United 
States.140 It comprises over 200 affiliated local broadcast stations that 
broadcast television programming free of charge to the general public.141 
Fox recoups the costs of “free television” by selling advertising spots 
and by entering into retransmission consent agreements with cable or 
satellite providers, collectively called multichannel video programming 
distributors (MVPDs).142 The advertising sales constitute 90% of Fox’s 
revenue and enable it to heavily invest in creating, producing, and 
distributing its programming.143 The most valued spot for commercial 
advertising is during primetime programming.144 “Primetime” refers to 
the time when television programming has the highest viewership.145 
Thus, advertisers pay higher prices for commercial advertising during 
primetime programming because more viewers see it.146 
Fox’s retransmission agreements permit MVPDs to retransmit 
television programming through their own cable or satellite broadcasting 
systems.147 Some agreements may also permit the MVPDs to provide a 
library of Fox’s previously aired programming and make it immediately 
accessible to its users.148 This is commonly called video-on-demand 
(VOD) services.149 Fox also licenses its previously aired programming 
to companies in secondary markets, such as Hulu, Amazon, or iTunes, 
 
time-shifting, ad-skipping, and library-building were at issue in Sony, but the Court only held time-
shifting was fair use). 
 138.  Notkin, supra note 129, at 917.  
 139.  Id. at 918. 
 140.  Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2012), 
aff’d, 723 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 141.  Complaint, supra note 14, at 8. 
 142.  Id. at 21-23. 
 143.  Annual Assessment, supra note 111, at 8695. 
 144.  See Complaint, supra note 14, at 21-23. 
 145.  Id. at 22. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  See id. at 1. 
 148.  Id. at 5. 
 149.  Id. at 24. 
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who then stream the content to their own subscribers.150 
Dish Network is the third largest cable and satellite television 
provider in the United States with over 14 million subscribers.151 After 
its purchase of Blockbuster’s assets in 2011, it emerged as a competitor 
in VOD services with its new offering of the Blockbuster@Home 
service.152 Dish also released a similar service, the Hopper Whole-Home 
HD DVR System (the “Hopper”), in March 2012.153 The Hopper 
functions as a combination of a traditional DVR and a VOD service.154 It 
resembles a traditional DVR because it allocates a portion of its 2TB 
hard drive for its users to save programs of their choosing.155 The 
remainder of the hard drive is used to store up to 100 hours of primetime 
programming from the Major Networks.156 Users can “enable” 
Primetime Anytime (PTAT) with the click of a button on their remote.157 
Once enabled, users can also specifically select which primetime 
programming they wish to record.158 If the user does not predetermine 
what programming he wishes to record, Dish will record the primetime 
programming from the Major Networks every night by default.159 A user 
may also elect to save the PTAT copies onto the traditional DVR portion 
of the Hopper within an eight-day period.160 
PTAT is also accompanied with the “AutoHop” feature.161 At the 
click of a button, a Dish user can eliminate all commercial 
advertisements in the PTAT recordings.162 Dish technicians in Wyoming 
manually view the primetime recordings, mark the start and end times of 
the commercials, and then transmit an “announcement” file to its 
subscribers.163 In addition to the “announcement’ file, Dish has three 
“beta Hoppers” that test the file for quality assurance purposes.164 Unlike 
the common 30-second skip feature on most DVRs, the viewer simply 
has to enable AutoHop and the recording skips to the next segment of 
 
 150.  Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 723 F.3d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 151.  Id. See also Annual Assessment, supra note 111, at 8622. 
 152.  See Complaint, supra note 14, at 29. 
 153.  Fox, 723 F.3d at 1071. 
 154.  Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
 155.  Id. at 1095-96. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. at 1094. 
 158.  Id. at 1072. 
 159.  Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 723 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 160.  Id. at 1072. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. 
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the program.165 Dish’s Hopper also works with up to three other set-top 
boxes in the household, called “Joeys.”166 The Joeys can access any of 
the programs recorded on the Hopper.167 Moreover, the Hopper works 
with the “Sling Adapter,” which provides its users access to their 
recorded programs on their computers and mobile devices.168 
B. Procedural History 
Shortly after Dish released its AutoHop service in May 2012, Dish 
filed for a declaratory judgment in New York’s Southern District against 
the Major Networks, stating its services did not infringe or breach its 
retransmission agreements.169 Fox simultaneously filed a complaint in 
the Central District of California alleging that Dish’s PTAT and 
AutoHop features directly and indirectly infringed its copyrights.170 
Specifically, Fox asserted Dish should be liable for contributory 
copyright infringement.171 The Southern District of New York held that 
Dish’s copyright claim was an improper anticipatory filing and 
accordingly dismissed it.172 Meanwhile, in California’s Central District, 
Fox moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin Dish from the 
continued operation and offering of its allegedly infringing products and 
services.173 The district court denied the motion, holding that Fox did not 
show a likelihood of success on its contributory infringement claim 
because it “failed to circumvent Sony.”174 In other words, Dish could not 
be liable for contributory infringement because its users’ conduct did not 
constitute infringement.175 Fox appealed to the Ninth Circuit on the 
ground that the district court failed to appreciate the factual differences 
between the time-shifting at issue in Sony and Dish’s PTAT and 
AutoHop services.176 
 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093-94 (C.D. Cal. 
2012). 
 170.  Complaint, supra note 14. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Dish Network, L.L.C. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., No. 12 CIV. 4155 (LTS) (KNF), 2012 
WL 2719161 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2012). In October 2013, the court also dismissed the Major 
Networks’ motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that Dish was likely to succeed on its fair 
use claim. Id. 
 173.  Fox, 905 F. Supp. 2d at 1096. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  See id. 
 176.  Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 5-7, Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 723 
F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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C. Decision 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision and agreed 
that Sony provided strong guidance.177 Although Sony never ruled on the 
legality of ad-skipping and library-building, the Ninth Circuit found this 
immaterial because Fox only owns copyrights in the programming and 
not the commercials.178 Thus, the court excluded Dish’s AutoHop 
feature from its fair use analysis because ad-skipping does not implicate 
Fox’s copyright interests.179 
For the first fair use factor, the Ninth Circuit agreed that the 
purpose and character of PTAT is similar to time-shifting in Sony.180 
Next, the court cited Sony’s analysis of the second and third fair use 
factors, without discussing any factual differences between the two 
cases.181 Finally, the court noted that the potential market harm analysis 
differed from Sony because a secondary market exists in which Fox 
licenses its programming.182 However, the court reasoned that Fox and 
its amici only feared the harm from ad-skipping and not the availability 
of VOD services.183 Although the district court acknowledged that 
Dish’s AutoHop service harmed Fox’s ability to negotiate a value and 
enter into similar licensing agreements for its programming, the 
appellate court found this harm inapplicable because it addressed a 
different question in the opinion.184 The court therefore concluded that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in its decision to deny Fox’s 
motion for a preliminary injunction.185 
III. ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that Fox failed 
to establish a likelihood of success on its contributory infringement 
claim because the user-made PTAT copies qualified as fair use under 
Sony, and therefore there was no infringement for which Dish could be 
liable.186 The court severely misconstrued the doctrine of fair use to 
reach this conclusion.187 First, it erred by excluding AutoHop and 
 
 177.  Fox, 723 F.3d 1067. 
 178.  Id. at 1075. 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Id. at 1075-76. 
 182.  Id. at 1076. 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Id. at 1076. 
 187.  See infra Part IV.B. 
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creating an unprecedented rule. Next, the court conducted an inadequate 
fair use analysis by ignoring the factual differences between Sony and 
Fox v. Dish Network proceedings. This is evident in its analysis of all 
four fair use factors.188 If the court had observed the differences, it 
would not have used Sony’s fair use analysis as a crutch in its decision, 
and it would have found that all four factors weigh against a finding of 
fair use for Dish. 
A. Exclusion of AutoHop 
The first issue with the Ninth Circuit’s fair use analysis is its 
exclusion of Dish’s AutoHop feature.189 The court held that AutoHop 
should be excluded from the market harm analysis because it merely 
skips over portions of the PTAT copies that Fox does not have a 
copyright interest in.190 This reasoning is doctrinally unsound and 
inconsistent with Sony and the goals of copyright law.191 
Fair use analysis assumes that an unauthorized copy has been made 
already and focuses on whether the use of that copy is fair.192 The Ninth 
Circuit found that Fox presented a prima facie case of copyright 
infringement because Dish users make copies of its programming.193 
When Dish users make the copies, the commercials are still included.194 
The fact that Dish users enable AutoHop to skip the advertisements is 
part of the use of the infringing copy. The court avoided this conclusion 
and reasoned that using AutoHop is not part of the use because it does 
not implicate Fox’s copyright.195 In other words, the court reasoned that 
AutoHop should be excluded from the analysis because it is not 
copyright infringement in itself.196 This is backwards reasoning. A prima 
facie case of infringement requires the court to determine what the 
defendant took that is protected by the copyright holder, and the court 
already made this finding.197 The effect of the court’s reasoning is an 
unprecedented rule that excludes certain uses under a fair use analysis if 
 
 188.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 189.  See Fox, 723 F.3d at 1075. 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  See supra Part II. 
 192.  Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 5, Fox, 723 F.3d 1067. 
 193.  Fox, 723 F.3d at 1074. 
 194.  Commercials are only excluded from the recording if the user enables “AutoHop.” Id. at 
1072. 
 195.  Id. at 1075. 
 196.  Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, supra note 192, at 5. 
 197.  The court stated earlier in its opinion that Fox established a prima facie case of 
infringement. Fox, 723 F.3d at 1074. 
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that use itself is not copyright infringement.198 This boils down to 
requiring a second act of copyright infringement for the plaintiff to 
defeat a fair use defense.199 
If Fox has no copyright interest in the commercials, this fact should 
be included in the fair use analysis rather than excluded. In Harper & 
Row, the Supreme Court did not exclude the unprotected portions of 
President Ford’s memoir in Nation’s infringing copy.200 Instead, it 
distinguished between what was protected and unprotected when 
discussing the amount and substantiality of the portion used.201 Thus, 
rather than exclude the entire AutoHop function, the Ninth Circuit 
should have included it for its third factor analysis. 
The Ninth Circuit’s exclusion of AutoHop is also inconsistent with 
precedent and the policy of copyright law. The only decision that ever 
addressed ad-skipping is Sony. Although the Ninth Circuit quoted nearly 
all of Sony’s fair use analysis, it coincidentally left out the part where 
Sony addressed this.202 The Supreme Court did not believe ad-skipping 
posed a significant threat to the copyright holders because it was a far 
too tedious practice with the VTR.203 The Court did not state, however, 
that ad-skipping does not implicate the plaintiffs’ copyright interests.204 
In addition to the Ninth Circuit’s inconsistency with Sony, its new 
rule conflicts with the policy of copyright law.205 The Ninth Circuit’s 
new rule broadens the fair use doctrine and makes it nearly impossible to 
enforce a copyright.206 This renders copyright protection merely 
symbolic, rather than effective, which is the concern voiced in Sony.207 
Authors will have no incentive to create if nearly all subsequent uses of 
their works fall under the Ninth Circuit’s new “blanket” rule.208 
In sum, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly excluded AutoHop from its 
fair use analysis. Skipping commercials with AutoHop is a way in which 
 
 198.  Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, supra note 192, at 18. 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565-66 (1985). 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, supra note 192, at 5 (arguing that Sony 
expressly addressed commercial-skipping). 
 203.  Sony Corp. of Am. v. City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 452 n.36 (1984). 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 206.  See Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, supra note 192 (giving an example of 
an “Infringing Book of the Month Club” where, even though an individual illegally downloaded a 
book online, the Ninth Circuit’s new rule would treat it as fair use). 
 207.  Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. 
 208.  A policy of copyright law is to reward authors for their creative efforts. See id. at 477 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). A broad rule that renders nearly all uses of a copyright work to be fair 
will deter creators if they have no legal mechanism to adequately enforce their rights in their works. 
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the unauthorized copy is used. By requiring the use to implicate Fox’s 
copyright interests, the Ninth Circuit established an unprecedented rule 
that is inconsistent with Sony and the goals of copyright law. 
B. First Fair Use Factor 
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis under the first fair use factor is flawed 
for two reasons. First, it failed to address whether the PTAT copies are 
transformative. The Supreme Court’s most recent precedent explicitly 
states that the central purpose under the first fair use factor is to 
determine whether the new work is transformative.209 This is the 
dominant test used by courts, and interestingly enough it parallels the 
“productive” inquiry espoused by Justice Blackmun in his dissent in 
Sony.210 Thus, the Ninth Circuit ignored Supreme Court precedent that 
has reasoning contrary to the rationale in Sony. The second issue is the 
Ninth Circuit equating Dish’s PTAT service to Sony’s VTR, reasoning 
that it is likewise used for time-shifting and non-commercial purposes. 
1. The PTAT Copies are Not Transformative 
The PTAT copies are not transformative. A work is transformative 
if it adds new expression, meaning, or character to the work.211 
Referencing the PTAT copies, the court expressly recognized that “the 
program content is not altered in any way.”212 The only difference 
between Fox’s original broadcast programming and the PTAT copy is 
the medium in which it is embodied, and courts consistently hold that 
this is not transformative.213 Moreover, the district court held that Dish’s 
quality assurance copies are non-transformative.214 Since there is no 
difference between the quality assurance copies and the PTAT copies for 
Dish’s users, it follows that the court would likely find them to also be 
non-transformative.215 
 
 209.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-79 (1994). 
 210.  See PATRY, supra note 48, § 3:9; Murray, supra note 52. 
 211.  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.212. Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 723 F.3d 
1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 212.  Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 723 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 213.  See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that 
courts are “reluctant to find fair use when an original work is merely retransmitted in a different 
medium”); Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1998) (reasoning that the 
defendant’s retransmission of a radio broadcast leaves the original broadcasts unchanged); UMG 
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that 
converting CDs into MP3 files is insufficient to be transformative). 
 214.  Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network, L.C.C., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1103 (C.D. Cal. 2012), 
aff’d, 723 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 215.  After Dish’s technicians mark the files, they send an announcement to Dish’s users with a 
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A defendant’s use can also be transformative when it serves a 
different function than the original work.216 However, the PTAT copies 
are used for the same entertainment purposes as the original 
broadcast.217 This conclusion could be avoided if Dish’s users also used 
the programming for commentary or criticism purposes, but as the court 
recognized, the program content is not altered in any way.218 It can be 
argued that once AutoHop is enabled, Dish users alter the work by 
eliminating the commercials. Yet in reality this is merely trimming the 
insignificant parts while maintaining the most essential parts of the 
programming, which is non-transformative.219 
To summarize, it is probably not an accident that the Ninth Circuit 
neglected to address whether the PTAT copies are transformative. It is 
unlikely Dish could convince the court that the PTAT copies satisfy this 
standard. Dish users do not alter the content of Fox’s programming in 
any manner, and the copies surely do not further the ultimate goal of 
promoting the progress of science and useful arts. If the court considered 
whether the PTAT copies were transformative, it would undoubtedly 
weigh against a finding of fair use. 
2. PTAT is Not Used for Time-shifting 
The district court found that Dish users’ PTAT copies were used for 
time-shifting purposes.220 The Ninth Circuit adopted this finding and 
reasoned that since Sony held such a use is noncommercial, Dish’s 
PTAT service must likewise be noncommercial.221 A closer look at the 
facts of Sony and Fox v. Dish Network shows that PTAT is not as 
comparable to Sony’s VTR as the court purported it to be. Moreover, the 
purpose of the PTAT is more akin to library-building rather than time-
shifting, and it is more commercial in nature than the VTR. 
The modern version of time-shifting is arguably done with a 
traditional DVR. This is because users can select the programming they 
wish to watch at a later time and simply record it on a hard drive rather 
 
copy of the file. Fox, 723 F.3d at 1072. 
 216.  Murray, supra note 52, at 276. 
 217.  Cf. Fox, 723 F.3d at 1078 (PTAT “is ‘similar,’ even though not exactly the same, as time-
delayed or video-on-demand programming”). 
 218.  See Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 2013) (ruling that the band 
Green Day’s use of the plaintiff’s copyrighted image in its music video was transformative for its 
commentary purposes on Christianity).  
 219.  Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). 
 220.  Fox Broad. Co. Inc. v. Dish Network, L.C.C., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1098 (C.D. Cal. 
2012), aff’d, 723 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 221.  Fox, 723 F.3d at 1075. 
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than Betamax.222 There are obvious differences between a DVR and 
Sony’s VTR, but these differences have not been litigated because it is 
assumed that use of the traditional DVR is still protected under Sony.223 
Although Dish’s Hopper HD DVR system has a traditional DVR 
segment, Fox chose not to object to its use224 If it did make such an 
argument, Sony would most likely control. Instead, Fox takes issue with 
PTAT and AutoHop because they equate to library-building and ad-
skipping, rather than time-shifting.225 
To demonstrate how PTAT mirrors library-building, it is necessary 
to show how the reason for making PTAT copies is not equivalent to the 
time-shifting purpose in Sony. In Sony, the Court defined time-shifting 
as “the practice of recording a program to view it once at a later time, 
and thereafter erasing it.”226 The Court further stated that time-shifting is 
when an individual records a program he cannot view as it is being 
televised so he can watch it at a later date.227 This definition does not 
correspond with the use of PTAT for various reasons. First, Dish users 
do not need the foresight to select which program they want to watch at 
a later time; VTR users had to set the tuner to the channel they wished to 
record.228 Also, Dish users do not need to select which programming 
they wish to record.229 Instead, they simply enable PTAT, and all 
primetime programming from the four Major Networks is recorded in 
perpetuity.230 The advertising and name of PTAT itself show that PTAT 
is not merely a system used to shift programming that the user intends to 
watch at a later date.231 Instead, it is used to create an instantaneous 
library of programming to be accessed at “anytime.”232 
 
 222.  Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2008). But 
see Picker, supra note 110, at 206 (claiming that the DVR “is much more than just a souped-up 
VCR”). 
 223.  See Fox, 723 F.3d at 1074. 
 224.  Complaint, supra note 14, at 3. 
 225.  Fox, 723 F.3d at 1075. 
 226.  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 423 (1984) (emphasis 
added). 
 227.  Id. at 421. 
 228.  Id. at 422-23. 
 229.  By default, PTAT records programming on all four major networks every day of the 
week. Fox Broad. Co. Inc. v. Dish Network, L.C.C., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (C.D. Cal. 2012), 
aff’d 723 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 230.  Id. 
 231.  When Dish first released PTAT, it expressly stated that PTAT creates an on-demand 
library of up to 100 hours of programming. See Press Release, DISH Network, L.L.C., Hopper 
Whole-Home HD DVR System Now Available From DISH (Mar. 15, 2012), available at DISH, 
http://about.dish.com/press-release/products-and-services/hopper-whole-home-hd-dvr-system-now-
available-dish. 
 232.  If a Dish subscriber connects the Hopper with a Sling Adapter, he or she can watch his or 
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Another distinction is that Dish users can record up to four 
programs at once because of the multiple tuners and satellite 
transponder.233 A VTR user could record only one program at a time.234 
This technological limitation is consistent with the definition of time-
shifting because it recorded the program the VTR user was unable to 
view at the time of broadcast. The Hopper is equipped with multiple 
tuners and a satellite transponder that enables users to simultaneously 
record the primetime programming from the four Major Networks.235 
The result is that Dish users are not time-shifting a program they would 
have watched. Instead, they are time-shifting programs. It is also 
impractical to equate the VTR with Dish’s PTAT because when VTR 
users set their tuners, they were also able to watch the original 
broadcast.236 Dish users are not practically able to watch programming 
on the Major Networks simultaneously.237 Moreover, after watching the 
PTAT copies, a Dish user can elect to save them on the traditional DVR 
segment of the Hopper.238 Thus, users do not record the program and 
thereafter erase it. 
A final distinction is the level of involvement that Dish has with the 
PTAT process. The PTAT process involves more than an individual 
time-shifting a program to watch at a later time.239 Dish provides the 
programming, sends its subscribers the links for the PTAT copies, and 
has an ongoing relationship with its customers.240 Dish also has the 
capability to determine the availability of programming.241 In Sony, the 
defendants did not maintain contact with the VTR users and had no 
control over what the users did with its product.242 The plaintiffs in Sony 
never alleged that Sony had involvement in the copying process.243 The 
 
her primetime programming on a computer, tablet, or phone, even away from home. Id.; see also 
Hopper DVR, DISH, http://www.dish.com/technology/hopper/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2015). 
 233.  Fox, 905 F. Supp. 2d at 1094. 
 234.  Betamax users could only watch one live broadcast while recording another for later 
viewing. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 422 (1984). 
 235.  Fox, 905 F. Supp. 2d at 1094. 
 236.  Sony, 464 U.S. at 422. 
 237.  Fox, 905 F. Supp. 2d at 1094. 
 238.  PTAT copies are automatically deleted after eight days. Id. Dish users can avoid this by 
making copies to save in their “My Recordings” folder. Id. 
 239.  Sony, 464 U.S.at 421. 
 240.  In fact, the district court observed how Dish had a closer relationship with its subscribers 
than the defendants in Cablevision. Fox, 905 F. Supp. 2d at 1101. 
 241.  Dish can change the start and end times of primetime programming to fall outside the 
regular primetime timeframe. See Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 723 F.3d 1067, 
1071 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 242.  See Sony, 464 U.S. at 420. 
 243.  On appeal, the Court only considered whether Sony could be held liable for the alleged 
copyright infringement done by Betamax users. Id. at 420. 
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fact that Dish’s involvement in the copying process is being litigated 
highlights the difference between the two defendants. Even if the 
volitional conduct argument is ignored, the fact that Dish provides the 
programming to the user and has the technological capability to maintain 
contact with its users undeniably shows that it has more involvement 
with the copying process than the defendant in Sony.244 In short, this 
level of involvement is significant because it is more than an individual 
recording a program to be viewed at a later time. 
If the purpose of PTAT is not comparable to the traditional DVR 
and is not equivalent to the time-shifting discussed in Sony, this begs the 
question – what is it comparable to? Library-building. Justice Blackmun 
defined library-building as the practice of recording a program and 
keeping it for repeated viewing over a longer period of time.245 Thus, it 
differs from time-shifting because it is not immediately erased. Once 
PTAT is enabled, the copies are saved for eight days.246 The eight-day 
limitation is misleading, though, because users can save the individual 
copies to the traditional DVR segment of the Hopper.247 The obvious 
counterpoint is that, just because Dish users have that capability, it does 
not necessarily mean they are utilizing it. For instance, VTR users did 
not library-build because of the associated costs.248 However, the threat 
of library-building is much more imminent with PTAT because the costs 
and ease of library-building are substantially different.249 Thus, it is 
more likely that Dish users engage in library-building. 
Most importantly, the underlying purpose of PTAT is similar to 
library-building. The purpose of collecting a library of recordings is for 
the convenience of having a wide selection of programs to choose from. 
Once PTAT is enabled, it records the Major Networks’ primetime 
programming on a daily basis, ultimately amassing a library of up to 100 
 
 244.  The volitional conduct doctrine is used to determine whether a party exercises a sufficient 
degree of conduct to hold him directly liable instead of indirectly liable. See Cartoon Network LP, 
LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 2008) (reasoning that Cablevision merely 
made the copying option available to its users, therefore not possessing a sufficient degree of 
volitional conduct to be directly liable). See also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On–Line Commc’n 
Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (claiming that there should be some element of 
volitional conduct to hold a party directly liable); CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 
556 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that the defendant’s short screening process was only cursory and 
insufficient to hold it directly liable). 
 245.  Sony, 464 U.S. at 459 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 246.  See Hopper DVR, supra note 232. 
 247.  Id. 
 248.  One witness testified that he bought Sony’s VTR with the intention of building a library, 
but it proved to be too expensive. Sony, 464 U.S. at 423 n.3. 
 249.  For instance, a Dish subscriber simply has to select “enable” at no additional cost, and 
PTAT records up to 100 hours of programming. See Complaint, supra note 14, at 2. 
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hours of programming.250 This is because users record four channels at 
once.251 The result is that Dish users have over 100 hours of primetime 
programming to choose from.252 Put another way, they are not watching 
a program they recorded for later viewing, but choosing from a plethora 
of recordings. 
In sum, there are various differences between Sony the Ninth 
Circuit’s characterization of a Dish subscriber’s use of PTAT for time-
shifting purposes. This distinction is significant because Sony deemed 
time-shifting a fair use and not library-building. Thus, treating the use of 
PTAT as library-building should make Sony less influential in the fair 
use analysis. 
3. PTAT Copies are More Commercial than Time-shifting in Sony 
There are factual differences that render the purpose of copying 
Fox’s primetime programming more commercial in nature than the time-
shifting present in Sony. Dish users do not sell the PTAT copies to the 
public and neither did Sony’s VTR users.253 Because of this similarity, 
the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the use is equally as noncommercial.254 
This is a misconception of the profit/nonprofit distinction. In Harper & 
Row, the Supreme Court clarified this inquiry and stated that the Court 
should not focus on whether the defendant’s sole motive is monetary 
gain, but rather whether the defendant stands to gain from exploiting the 
copyrighted material without paying the customary price for it.255 
Subsequent cases also hold that an infringer does not need to directly 
benefit.256 Rather, commercial use can be shown when an individual 
makes copies to avoid the expense of purchasing lawful copies.257 
This clarification further shows how the Ninth Circuit’s analysis is 
flawed. At the time of Sony, no secondary market existed for the 
copyright holder’s works, and therefore VTR users did not avoid paying 
the customary price for their recordings.258 The Ninth Circuit even 
acknowledged this fact later in its opinion.259 The present litigation 
 
 250.  Id. 
 251.  By default, PTAT records the programming from all four networks every night. Fox 
Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 723 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 252.  See Complaint, supra note 14, at 2. 
 253.  See Fox, 723 F.3d at 1075; Sony, 464 U.S. at 425. 
 254.  Fox, 723 F.3d at 1075. 
 255.  Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985). 
 256.  A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 257.  Id. 
 258.  Fox, 723 F.3d at 1076. 
 259.  Id.  
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differs from Sony because a secondary market does exist.260 Dish’s users 
avoid paying this customary price by recording Fox’s primetime 
programming through PTAT. Thus, Dish users gain by not paying the 
customary price for Fox’s programming. 
Another distinction to be drawn between the two cases is the 
exploitative nature of the use. Even if a use is commercial, it is given 
less weight when it is incidental rather than exploitative.261 For instance, 
a search engine that reproduces copyrighted images is only incidentally 
commercial when it is not using the images to promote its website or 
profiting from them.262 An example of exploitative use is the repeated 
and widespread sharing of music files.263 The use of PTAT more closely 
resembles the widespread sharing of music files.264 Once PTAT is 
enabled, Dish users record Fox’s programming on a daily basis for as 
long as they desire.265 As previously stated, the time-shifting in Sony 
involved a user that recorded a single program who then viewed it 
once.266 Given this difference, Dish’s PTAT appears to be more 
exploitative than the use of Sony’s VTR. 
The discussion above illustrates the many errors in the Ninth 
Circuit’s analysis of the first fair use factor. The Supreme Court’s most 
recent fair use decision directs the court to consider the transformative 
nature of the defendant’s use.267 It is not coincidental that the Ninth 
Circuit ignored this factor because Dish users do not alter the 
programming in any manner. There are significant factual differences 
between Sony’s VTR and Dish’s PTAT that render the use of PTAT 
more akin to library-building rather than time-shifting, but the court 
failed to acknowledge this. 
The more transformative a work is, the less significant other factors 
are, such as commercialism.268 The inverse is also true: the less 
transformative a work is, the more important other factors become, such 
as commercialism.269 Although Dish users do not sell the PTAT copies, 
the use appears to be more commercial in nature than the use of Sony’s 
 
 260.  Fox licenses its primetime programming with and without commercials to companies 
such as Hulu, who then offer it to their subscribers for a fee. Id. at 1070. 
 261.  See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 262.  Id. 
 263.  See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 264.  See id. 
 265.  Once PTAT is enabled, Dish records the primetime programming from the Major 
Networks every weekday. Fox, 723 F.3d at 1071. 
 266.  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 423 (1984). 
 267.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994). 
 268.  Id. 
 269.  See id. 
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VTR. The court’s errors collectively show that the first fair use factor 
should have weighed against a finding of fair use. 
C. Second and Third Fair Use Factor 
The Ninth Circuit purported to apply the second and third use 
factors by quoting verbatim the Sony Court’s one-sentence analysis of 
those factors.270 This is the most troubling of the court’s opinion because 
Sony “all but ignores” these factors.271 The bare analysis for both factors 
in Sony can be found within one sentence of the decision, where Justice 
Stevens stated: 
[W]hen one considers the nature of a televised . . . work . . . and that 
timeshifting merely enables a viewer to see such a work which he had 
been invited to witness in its entirety free of charge, the fact that the 
entire work is reproduced . . . does not have its ordinary effect of mili-
tating against a finding of fair use.272 
Considering the more recent Supreme Court decisions and factual 
differences between Sony and Fox v. Dish Network, these factors should 
also weigh against a fair use finding. 
1. Second Fair Use Factor 
The second factor directs the court to consider the “nature of the 
copyrighted work.”273 This includes recognizing whether the works are 
close to the core of copyright protection.274 There is a greater need to 
disseminate factual works compared to fictional works.275 As a result, a 
court is more likely to find the use of factually based works to be fair.276 
To the contrary, a court is less likely to consider the use of a creative 
work to be fair because there is a greater need to protect them.277 The 
Court in Sony explicitly recognized that copyrighted material with broad 
potential secondary markets, such as motion pictures, deserve more 
protection than news broadcasts.278 Fox’s programming is comparable to 
motion pictures and fictional short stories. Shows such as Family Guy 
and Bones are purely fictional and do not convey newsworthy 
 
 270.  Fox, 723 F.3d at 1075. 
 271.  Sony, 464 U.S. at 496 (Blackmun, J. dissenting). 
 272.  Id. at 449 (majority opinion). 
 273.  17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2012). 
 274.  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
 275.  Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563, 588 (1985). 
 276.  Id. 
 277.  Id. 
 278.  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 n.40 (1984). 
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information for which there is a public need. 
The fact that Fox’s primetime programming is close to the core of 
copyright protection differs from Sony. First, Sony addressed whether it 
was infringement for a VTR user to record television programming in 
general.279 The testimony at trial included representatives from 
professional sports leagues, educational institutions, and religious 
organizations.280 The Court also acknowledged that some televised 
works did not have copyright protection.281 The plaintiffs’ own 
copyrights comprised of about 9-10% of the entire spectrum of 
television programming in question.282 Fox’s primetime programming is 
the only television programming at issue in the current litigation, and 
therefore, its works consist of 100% of the programming in question 
rather than 9-10%.283 Since Fox’s primetime programming is close to the 
core of copyright protection and does not include educational 
programming, noncopyrighted works, or religious programming, this 
factor should weigh more in favor of Fox than it did for the plaintiffs in 
Sony. 
The Ninth Circuit also failed to consider the “primetime” nature of 
Fox’s programming. As Harper & Row recognized, a copyright holder 
has an interest in the creative control of its copyrighted work.284 This 
interest includes the choices of when, where, and in what form the work 
is offered.285 Fox offers its copyrighted works, such as Glee, Bones, and 
Family Guy, during the primetime hours because it captures the largest 
viewing audience.286 By making the PTAT copies, users undercut Fox’s 
legitimate interest in controlling when, where, and how the primetime 
programming is viewed.287 If the copyright holder of an unpublished 
memoir has an interest in controlling when it is published, then the 
copyright holder of television programming should likewise have an 
interest in controlling when it is viewed.288 
2. Third Fair Use Factor 
The third factor, “the amount and substantiality of the portion used 
 
 279.  Id. at 421. 
 280.  Id. at 424. 
 281.  Id. at 433. 
 282.  Id. at 443. 
 283.  Fox, 723 F.3d at 1070-71. 
 284.  Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985). 
 285.  Id. 
 286.  See Complaint, supra note 14, at 1. 
 287.  Dish’s advertisements claim that users can watch programming “on the go” and on smart 
phones, computers, tablets, and televisions. See Hopper DVR, supra note 232. 
 288.  See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539. 
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in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,” weighs against a finding 
of fair use.289 This factor includes a qualitative and quantitative 
consideration, and both favor Fox’s cause.290 For the quantitative part, 
courts generally disfavor a finding of fair use when a user copies a work 
in its entirety.291 It is undisputed that Dish users copy Fox’s entire 
primetime programming.292 This is true whether or not AutoHop is 
included in the analysis, because as the court stated, Fox does not own 
the copyright to the commercials.293 Thus, at first glance this factor 
should weigh in favor of Fox. The flaw to this argument is that the 
extent of permissible copying also varies with the purpose of the use in 
question.294 For example, if a plaintiff owns the copyright to a 
photograph and the defendant copies it for news-reporting purposes, the 
fact that he copied the photograph in its entirety does not have the 
ordinary effect of weighing against fair use because the picture would 
not have been identifiable if he only copied a portion of it.295 This is the 
same reasoning used in Sony when the Court held that copying a 
program in its entirety does not have the ordinary effect of militating 
against a finding of fair use because the purpose of time-shifting itself is 
to watch the entire program.296 
According to this reasoning, it would seem that Sony controls and 
that the court should excuse the wholesale copying of Fox’s 
programming. However, courts excuse wholesale copying when the 
purpose or character of the use is transformative.297 The Supreme Court 
recognized this in Campbell when it excused the amount taken by 2 Live 
Crew because of the transformative nature of parody.298 Thus, the 
Supreme Court’s more recent jurisprudence holds that the amount taken 
will generally not weigh against a finding of fair use if that use is 
transformative.299 Because Sony predated Campbell, its reasoning is not 
applicable because the Court had yet to adopt the transformative test.300 
Accordingly, the fact that users copy all of Fox’s programming should 
not have its ordinary effect of militating against a fair use finding if the 
 
 289.  See 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2012). 
 290.  See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564-66; PATRY, supra note 48, § 5:1. 
 291.  PATRY, supra note 48, § 5:3. 
 292.  Fox, 723 F.3d at 1074. 
 293.  Id. 
 294.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586-87 (1994). 
 295.  See Núñez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 296.  Sony Corp. of Am. v. City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984). 
 297.  See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 594. 
 298.  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-87. 
 299.  Id. 
 300.  See Sony, 464 U.S. 417; cf. Campbell, 510 U.S. 569. 
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copying is transformative, and as discussed above, there is barely an 
argument that the PTAT copies are transformative.301 
The qualitative aspect also weighs against a finding of fair use. 
Since Dish users copy the entire programming, it cannot be seriously 
argued that they do not take the “heart” of the work.302 This argument is 
even stronger if AutoHop is considered in the analysis because the 
“heart” of the work is the programming without the commercials.303 
Once AutoHop is enabled, Dish users are left with a copy that only 
consists of the programming and not the commercials they wish to 
avoid.304 With AutoHop enabled, the PTAT copy becomes a condensed 
version of the most valuable parts of the programming, and the Supreme 
Court has recognized this as weighing against fair use since 1841.305 
As shown, the Ninth Circuit wrote off the second and third fair use 
factors by simply quoting Sony.306 This is improper because the nature of 
the works in question is more creative than the works in Sony. This is 
because only Fox’s primetime programming is at issue rather than the 
entire spectrum of television programming. The third factor should also 
weigh against a finding of fair use because the entire work is copied and 
the use is not transformative. Overall, both factors should weigh against 
a finding of fair use. 
D. Fourth Fair Use Factor 
The fourth factor requires the court to determine “the effect of the 
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”307 
When a subsequent user copies the work in its entirety, it acts as a 
market substitute of the original.308 On the other hand, a transformative 
use does not necessarily act as a market substitute and instead reaches 
the derivative markets.309 As discussed, the PTAT copies are neither 
transformative nor altered in any manner.310 Therefore, analysis of the 
derivative markets is not necessary, and the analysis should focus on 
 
 301.  See discussion supra Part IV.B.1. 
 302.  See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985) 
(reasoning that Nation took the heart of President Ford’s memoirs). 
 303.  See Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 723 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 304.  Id. 
 305.  See generally Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). 
 306.  See Fox, 723 F.3d at 1070. 
 307.  17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012). 
 308.  In Campbell, the Court stated that Sony’s discussion of a market harm presumption 
makes sense in the context of verbatim copying because it acts as a market replacement. Campbell 
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994). 
 309.  Id. 
 310.  See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
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whether the PTAT copies harm the market for Fox’s primetime 
programming instead of derivative markets. 
The court’s error in this section of the opinion is not because of its 
reliance on Sony and its failure to address factual differences. Instead, 
the error of the court’s analysis lies in its misapplication of the facts. The 
Ninth Circuit reasoned that the copies do not harm the market because 
Fox does not charge additional fees for MVPDs to offer VOD services, 
so long as providers disable fast-forwarding features.311 Therefore, the 
court inferred that only ad-skipping caused the market harm.312 This is 
contrary to the district court’s finding that Dish’s quality assurance 
copies cause market harm.313 The Ninth Circuit dismissed this finding 
however, because it addressed a different question in the opinion.314 
The unrestricted and widespread copying of Fox’s primetime 
programming surely impairs the market for Fox’s programming. The 
court disagreed because it only focused on the ad-skipping aspect.315 The 
record amply demonstrates that Fox licenses its primetime programming 
to providers in the secondary market, both with and without 
commercials.316 The licensees enter into the agreements because they 
receive the value of the primetime programming and are able to generate 
revenue by offering it to its own users.317 The demand for primetime 
programming in the secondary market will diminish if those users can 
get the programming without paying any additional cost.318 With 
declining demand, what incentive would secondary market licensees 
have to enter into agreements with Fox? Moreover, if the approximately 
13.5 million Dish users319 can save whole seasons of primetime 
television on their DVR, the value of the season box sets sold at retail 
stores is severely diminished. 
 
 311.  Fox, 723 F.3d at 1076. 
 312.  Id. 
 313.  Fox Broad. Co. Inc. v. Dish Network, L.C.C., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 
2012), aff’d, 723 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 314.  Id. 
 315.  The court concluded that only ad-skipping caused market harm and not the time-shifting 
or library-building. Fox, 723 F.3d at 1076. 
 316.  Hulu Plus subscribers can watch Fox’s programming in a reduced-commercial format, 
while iTunes and Amazon users can purchase the programming commercial-free. Fox, 905 F. Supp. 
2d at 1105. 
 317.  For instance, Hulu subscribers need to pay a subscription fee in order to watch the 
programming. Id. 
 318.  In fact, Dish’s Vice President stated that its subscribers will not need Hulu after it 
releases PTAT. Complaint, supra note 14, at 32. 
 319.  Our Mission, DISH, http://about.dish.com/company-info (last visited Jan. 12, 2015). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The Fox v. Dish Network litigation touches the homes of the 
majority of American consumers. But when put in perspective, this 
decision is only a fragment of the crumbling broadcasting industry’s 
problems as American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. comes before 
the Supreme Court and blackouts over retransmission consent agreement 
disputes become commonplace.320 Nevertheless, the Fox v. Dish 
Network litigation has the potential to address the legality of modern 
time-shifting, ad-skipping, library-building, and even the ambiguous 
contributory infringement doctrine. 
Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit’s decision does not necessarily 
answer those questions. If anything, the court obfuscated matters by 
excluding AutoHop from its fair use analysis. Moreover, the court’s fair 
use analysis is ignorant of the Supreme Court’s most recent precedent 
and fact specific nature of the fair use doctrine.321 Had the Ninth Circuit 
conducted a more in-depth analysis, it would have found that Dish did 
not present a viable fair use defense to Fox’s contributory infringement 
claim. 
Critics of this conclusion claim that this would subject innocent 
consumers to liability for copyright infringement. This is not accurate. 
The purpose of the analysis in Fox v. Dish Network is to determine 
whether Fox has a viable claim of contributory copyright infringement 
against Dish Network for offering its PTAT and AutoHop service. If the 
court had found that use of the PTAT copies is not fair use, then Dish 
could be held liable for contributory infringement. Such a decision 
would prevent MVPDs like Dish from offering instruments of 
widespread infringement in the first place. Even if these services are still 
offered, fair use is to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each 
case. The fair use analysis above involved a generalization of all Dish 
users. An individual Dish user would only be subject to liability if 
warranted under the particular facts. 
In the end, fair use is a policy decision left to the courts. There are 
no bright line rules and, accordingly, no clear-cut answers. But this does 
not divest the courts of their obligation to conduct a fact-specific 
analysis to reach a conclusion. The discussion above illustrates that the 
Ninth Circuit failed to do this. Many argue that the consequences of Fox 
v. Dish Network are inevitable and that the broadcasting industry must 
adapt its business model accordingly. But if the business model of the 
broadcasting industry is to change, it should be by the invisible hand of 
 
 320.  See supra note 12. 
 321.  See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
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capitalism, and not by a cursory fair use analysis. 
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